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Abstract The scope and purpose of this special issue
is to reassess the relationships between private equity
(PE) investors and their portfolio companies in the
light of the need for venture capital/ private equity
(VC/PE) firms to adapt their strategies for value
creation in the light of the recent financial crisis. We
particularly focus upon VC/PE characteristics that
differently contribute to portfolio firm performance.
The papers presented in this special issue capture this
aim in various ways, reflecting the heterogeneity of
VC/PE investors and the firms in which they invest.
We begin this introductory paper by providing a brief
overview of each paper’s contribution. We articulate
themes for an agenda for future research relating to the
heterogeneity of investor types and the contexts in
which they invest.
Keywords Private equity  Venture capital 
Business angels  Investor heterogeneity  Overview 
Future research
JEL Classifications G24  G32  L26  M13
1 Introduction
Literature on venture capital (VC) and private equity
(PE) depicts a broadly positive view of their activities.
Detailed reviews of formal VC are provided by
Manigart and Wright (2012), of PE by Wright et al.
(2009) and of business angel VCs by Kelly (2007). Most
empirical studies covered by these reviews find that the
post-investment growth and/or performance of inves-
tors’ portfolio companies is higher than that of non-
venture capital backed companies. This positive effect is
attributed to investment managers’ selection skills (e.g.
Shepherd 1999; Baum and Silverman 2004), their value-
adding activities leading to professionalization of
portfolio companies (e.g. Sapienza et al. 1996; Baum
and Silverman 2004; Colombo and Grilli 2010), the
tightened post-investment governance of portfolio
companies including monitoring activities (e.g. Filatot-
chev et al. 2006), the provision of additional financial
resources (e.g. Hellmann et al. 2008; Janney and Folta
2006; Vanacker and Manigart 2010) and the transfer of
reputation and legitimacy to portfolio companies (e.g.
Timmons and Bygrave 1986).
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Current academic evidence has made some
recognition of the heterogeneity of VC/PE investors
and the differential contribution they make to
portfolio companies (Fitza et al. 2009). In light of
the worldwide decline in VC/PE investment activity
due to the financial and economic crisis, VC/PE
investors need to re-engineer their business models
and differentiate themselves in order to remain
attractive partners for entrepreneurial companies.
The purpose of this special issue is hence to focus
upon VC/PE characteristics and behaviours that
differently contribute to portfolio firm performance,
as a route for VC/PE partners to shape their
strategies.
VC/PE investors differ with respect to their
resource endowments, including the human capital
of their investment managers and partners, their social
capital built up through their investment networks and
their shareholders, their experience or their legal form.
This leads to differences in their investment strategy,
e.g., whether they invest in a restricted industry, stage
or geographic niche or in a broad range of portfolio
companies, and in their investment approach, e.g.,
how they select and manage their portfolio of
companies.
Heterogeneity in VC/PE investor characteristics
and investment approach leads to differences in
investment outcome. For example, experienced VC/
PE investors with a broad network are especially
able to select the best portfolio companies (Gompers
et al. 2008) and help them develop, while interna-
tional investors are relevant for entrepreneurial
companies wishing to expand or exit abroad
(Ma¨kela¨ and Maula 2006, 2008; Zahra et al. 2007;
Lockett et al. 2008). However, the extent to which
heterogeneity has been recognized in the academic
literature is limited. For example, much research
focused on independent VC/PE investors and busi-
ness angels, yet outside the United States many VC/
PE investors are divisions of financial institutions,
corporate VC investors or public sector VC inves-
tors (Bottazzi and da Rin 2002). Different types of
investors may have different goals, different orga-
nizational forms and different abilities, potentially
impacting their selection, value adding and exit
skills. As VC/PE investors and entrepreneurs need
both to survive the crisis and prepare themselves for
the post-crisis period, reassessment of which models
work best in which context is needed.
2 Research in this special issue
Following a general call for submissions, an initial
selection of papers was presented at a workshop held at
the Vlerick School of Management, Ghent, Belgium.
Papers were reviewed according to standard SBE
procedures and Table 1 summarizes the papers in the
special issue that successfully negotiated this process.
Each paper investigates a specific aspect of investor
heterogeneity. The majority of the papers focus on
early stage VC investors, with one paper addressing the
MBO context and two papers incorporating different
categories of VC/PE investors: early stage VC inves-
tors, later stage VC investors or business angels.
Interestingly, many papers in this special issue use
novel databases, often drawing upon hand-collected
samples and data. This allows for more refined insights
compared to studies relying solely on commercial
databases, which, while broad in their coverage of the
VC/PE industry, lack fine-grained data on VC/PE
investors and their portfolio companies.
In the VC context, Walz and Hirsch (2012) and
Knockaert and Vanacker (2012) investigate investor
heterogeneity in VC investors’ selection behaviour
and suggest that differences in investment approach
are associated with differences in the post-investment
management process. Walz and Hirsch show that,
compared to bank-related and public VC investors,
independent VC investors negotiate contracts that
create more possibilities for active intervention post-
investment. This is consistent with the view that
independent VC investors are, in general, more hands-
on compared to other types of investors. Knockaert
and Vanacker show that independent VCs investing in
early stage technology focus more on entrepreneurial
team characteristics or financial criteria during selec-
tion, are less involved in value adding activities
compared to their peers, and focus more on techno-
logical criteria during selection.
Bertoni and colleagues (2012a, b) push the differen-
tial impact of independent and captive investors further.
Short-term sales growth is higher for companies
financed by independent VC firms than for companies
financed by corporate VC firms, but not short-term
employee growth. Long-term growth in sales and
employees is the same for both groups. They interpret
this as further evidence of grandstanding behaviour
by independent VC investors, who are under contin-
uous pressure to raise new funds (Gompers 1996).
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This pressure makes them push their portfolio compa-
nies harder to generate early sales, thereby enabling
investors to show higher performance to outsiders. This
short-term sales growth does not translate into a long
term advantage for their portfolio companies, however.
In a similar vein, Devigne and colleagues (2012) add to
the emerging literature on cross-border VC by showing
that the geographic origin of VC investors matters. In the
short run, domestic VCs are more beneficial for portfolio
company growth, as they have a deeper understanding
of the local environment, but in the long run cross-
border VC investors, providing access to and legitimacy
in foreign markets, are more beneficial. Portfolio
companies with syndicates comprising both domestic
and cross-border investors outperform other companies,
as they have access to both local and cross-border
resources. Both studies further suggest that life cycle
dynamics are important, and call for more attention to a
dynamic view of VC/PE effects which may be remark-
ably different.
Bobelyn et al. (2012) show that VC investors learn
from their experience. VC investment firms with more
trade sale experience and with highly experienced
investment managers increase the likelihood of their
portfolio companies exiting through a trade sale.
Congenital trade sale experience of investment man-
agers who join the fund partly compensates for the
lack of experience within the fund itself, but vicarious
learning from network partners does not contribute to
trade sale probability.
Bertoni and colleagues (2012a, b) focus on a largely
neglected but highly important aspect of VC investing,
namely, whether low and medium-tech VC backed
companies have lower finance constraints after invest-
ment. They show that expansion-stage VC investors
mainly invest in cash constrained companies, but firms
that were acquired by a PE investor did not show
investment-cash flow sensitivity before investment,
suggesting that cash constraints are not motives for
seeking PE investment in contrast to VC investment.
After the investment, cash constraints in VC-backed
firms disappear, while PE-backed firms seem to
become more cash constrained. This suggests that
the investment selection and management process of
mature VC investors and PE investors is markedly
different. Insights generated within the VC context
cannot be fully transferred to the PE context.
In a study investigating the post-buy-out process,
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not only efficiency driven. On the contrary, PE backed
buy-outs significantly increase entrepreneurial man-
agement practices. Notwithstanding, increased finan-
cial leverage positively affects efficiency-induced
administrative management in management buy-outs;
the impact of high financial leverage is larger for
majority PE backed buy-outs.
In a final study comprising both VC and business
angel (BA) investments, the darker sides of the
investor–entrepreneur relationship are explored. Col-
lewaert and Fassin (2012), based upon U.S. and
Belgian case studies, suggest that perceived uneth-
ical behaviour among venture partners triggers
conflicts between them through increased fault
attribution or blaming. Perceived unethical behav-
iour also affects partners’ choice of conflict man-
agement strategy, thereby increasing the likelihood
of conflicts escalating or having a negative outcome,
including failure or involuntary exit of either
entrepreneur or investor.
3 An agenda for further research
We envision an agenda for further research that
recognizes the heterogeneity of VC/PE equity types as
well as the heterogeneity of contexts in which they
invest. First, we propose that research on investor
heterogeneity should more carefully consider the
sources of heterogeneity within a VC/PE firm.
Figure 1 presents how an investment firm may consist
of different investment funds which, in turn, invest in
different portfolio companies. Investor heterogeneity
may hence originate at the firm, the fund and the
investment portfolio level.
Second, we argue that, hitherto, research in
entrepreneurial finance has not addressed suffi-
ciently the heterogeneity of context in particular
(Zahra and Wright 2011). Figure 2 shows how VC/
PE firms interact with the entrepreneurial team and
the deal within a specific institutional and legal
context. The effectiveness of investors’ investment
and involvement strategies is likely to be impacted
by deal and team characteristics, and will depend
on the institutional and legal context in which the
investment takes place. Table 2 summarizes the
interactions between the heterogeneity of investor
type and context. We expand on these topics
below.
4 Investor characteristics
Research on the impact of investor characteristics on
their investment behavior is rapidly growing. Our
current understanding of investor heterogeneity is very
scattered, while the VC and PE investment nexus is
complex. When considering business angel heteroge-
neity, the individual investors’ human, social and
financial capital and their psychological profile
including their motivation lead to an idiosyncratic
knowledge and experience base that impacts their
investment process. The situation becomes more
complex when deals are syndicated between business
Fig. 1 Hierarchies within a venture capital or private equity
firm
Fig. 2 Interactions between a venture capital/ private equity
(VC/PE) firm, the entrepreneurial team, the deal and the context
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angels, calling for consideration of the interactions
between investors with different characteristics. Com-
plexity and heterogeneity further increase when dif-
ferent types of investors, including business angels,
VC and PE investors, co-invest.
The situation of a VC or PE firm investing in an
entrepreneurial company is more complex, however.
Salient sources of heterogeneity reside at the invest-
ment firm level, at the fund level and at the level of
their portfolio companies, calling for a hierarchical
approach to investor heterogeneity. First, investment
firms may differ in their legal form. Most VC and PE
research has focused upon private independent firms
managing closed ended funds. Yet, globally other
legal forms exist. These forms include private open
ended firms, firms that are listed on stock markets, and
VC/PE firms that are subsidiaries of financial institu-
tions and corporations. Comparative analysis of the
different investment behaviours of these different
types of legal forms is needed. These different legal
forms may involve different investment objectives and
time-scales, as well as differences in the expertise of
executives and their incentives. For example, listed
VC/PE funds may be less constrained than closed end
funds to generate returns to investors within a typical
10-year period but on the other hand they may be
constrained by the need to satisfy the demands of stock
market analysts and the need to maintain quarterly
earnings. Further research is needed to compare the
risk-return behavior of these different firms and what
this means for the relationships with portfolio firms.
VC and PE firms may also differ in their dominant
shareholder or, in the realm of independent firms
managing closed end funds, in their most important
limited partners or LPs (Mayer et al. 2005). While
independent investment firms typically raise funds
from a wide variety of limited partners, captive firms
receive all (or most) of the money to be invested
from a parent company such as a corporate, a finan-
cial institution or a government-related organization.
Differences in dominant shareholder may result
in different investment objectives, compensation
schemes for investment managers (and ensuing dif-
ferences in investment managers characteristics and
professionalism), or investment horizons. For exam-
ple, public sector funds may place greater emphasis on
social returns, and captive funds may have objectives
at least partly to do with being a conduit for attracting
new long-term customers for parent banks or new
products for parent corporations.
Other investment firm characteristics that have been
investigated in the literature are their experience—
often measured by age, the size of the pool of funds
managed, the number of funds raised, the number of
(successful) investments in general, in a specific
industry or in a specific geographic area—their repu-
tation or their network position (reflecting differences
in syndicate patterns and partners). We call for more
fine-grained studies on how experience and reputation
can be disentangled, and how these important quali-
tative investor characteristics impact their selection,
monitoring, value added and exit behavior. Further,
dynamic studies could shed light on how reputation or
network positions originate and change over time, with
process studies being potentially fruitful in this area.
As another example, at the growth stage learning and
reputation development by different types of VC may
influence the nature of their involvement in their
portfolio companies. At present, we know little about
these differences. As suggested at the outset, within
each category of investor there is a further heteroge-
neity that has yet to be fully explored in terms of
relationships with portfolio companies. For example,
at the early stage, different types of VC firms may bring
different sets of expertise that match with the expertise
of entrepreneurs. In order to better understand the way
in which value is created through VC relationships
with portfolio firms we need to know more about which
types of resources, experience or network position that
a VC can bring are important for which tasks involved
in the development of a venture. A particular issue
relates to the potential difference in this regard between
the experience or network of the investment manager
or the experience or network of the VC/PE firm.
A second level of investor heterogeneity resides in
the legal entity from which the investment takes place.
Investments can be done in an investment fund
(managed by an investment firm), or directly from
the balance sheet managed by the parent. The latter
situation often, but not always, occurs in captive
investment firms, while the former typically occurs in
independent investment firms. Mixed forms are also
possible, with investment firms both managing invest-
ment funds and investing from their own balance sheet.
These differences may, again, lead to differences in
investment behavior, risk profile and outcomes.
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A third level of heterogeneity is the portfolio of
investee companies. A highly concentrated portfolio
implies a more concentrated risk in a specific industry
or geographic region, but leads to a stronger knowl-
edge base within the investment firm, which may be
beneficial for value adding activities. Gaining a deeper
understanding of this risk/return trade-off, and the
underlying mechanisms driving differences in risk and
return, is highly important. A neglected area of
research in this respect is how investment managers
learn from their portfolio companies and how they
transfer this knowledge to other investee companies
and to other investment managers.
More specifically, while PE firms are typically
thought of as investing in later stage buyout deals,
their moves to an industry or sector focus may mean
that they may also become involved in early stage and
growth deals. This may especially be the case given
the challenges in generating returns from efficiency
gains in buyout type investments. At present, the link
between PE firms and the mix of investment
stage(s) they invest in has not attracted attention. To
what extent do PE firms have the mix of skills to
enable them to grow as well as restructure portfolio
companies? To what extent do PE firms need to
syndicate with VC firms to access the skills they need
to facilitate growth? In the post financial crisis
environment, these are important challenges for PE
investors given the difficulties in accessing significant
amounts of debt that would enable them to achieve
gains through leverage (Wright et al. 2010).
Aforementioned examples are but a few of the
questions that could be addressed with respect to
investment firm heterogeneity. While the different
levels of heterogeneity have been addressed separately
in previous research, studies that explicitly take into
account the multiple levels of heterogeneity are
lacking. Further investigating the interaction between
the levels may be a fruitful area for further research.
5 Deal context
The relationship between investor and investee is not
only shaped by investor characteristics, but also by the
deal context, including the opportunity, the entrepre-
neurial team and the wider context in which the
investment takes place. With respect to deal context,
we suggest that while there has been a dichotomy in
the literature between VC and buyout stages, there has
been insufficient attention to an examination of the
early and growth/later stage VC investments. Further
research is warranted that examines these stages. For
example, which types of investors are best suited to
develop a specific type of portfolio company, or
opportunities developed by entrepreneurial teams with
an idiosyncratic mix of resources, knowledge and
experience?
VC typically involves multiple rounds of invest-
ment. Although there are comparisons of VC involve-
ment of different stages of investment, we know little
about how VC involvement changes across these
investment rounds. How do approaches to value
creation differ across rounds? How does the role of
syndicate partners in enabling the development of the
venture changes across investment rounds? How and
when does the process occur through which different
types of investors such as corporate or international
investors occur? The questions of what challenges
arise and how they are overcome in the process of
moving from one round to the next also arise and
warrant further scrutiny. These differences may also
be linked to and influence the eventual exit route
selected.
After IPO exit, VC investors sometimes stay as
partial owners and/or board members. Our current
understanding of how boards of VC-backed firms
change after IPO is limited. For example, what
determines whether VC managers stay as a board
member? And what effect does that have on post-IPO
performance?
Although for expositional reasons Table 2 takes
VC/PE/BA as distinct categories, research has largely
neglected the interactions between these types of
investors. As ventures develop through their life cycle
questions arise concerning whether one type of
investor exits fully as the new one enters or whether
earlier stage investors remain in place. For example, to
what extent do BAs remain in place when formal VCs
enter the deal and to what extent do these investors
remain in place when PE firms enter? This leads to
consideration of the associated rationale for and
challenges involved in retaining earlier stage investors
with potentially different skills and objectives. From
the perspective of the main focus of this special issue,
for example, to what extent do earlier stage investors
continue to add value to or frustrate the development
of ventures? Are BA investors retained because they
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continue to bring important market reputation? Are
VC investors retained because they have specialist
sector expertise not possessed by a more financially
oriented PE firm? Do earlier stage investors continue
to play a role on boards or become involved in
facilitating the development of more appropriate
boards for the next life cycle phase? More generally,
conceptual issues are raised concerning the nature of
principal–principal problems between BAs, VCs and
PEs and how these are resolved.
In the entrepreneurial growth literature it is begin-
ning to be recognized that it is important to gain more
fine-grained understanding about the nature of growth,
not just the extent of growth (McKelvie and Wiklund
2010; Clarysse et al. 2011). Similarly, there is a need
for greater understanding of the nature of the contri-
bution of VCs at the growth stage. At its simplest, such
analysis might examine the role of VCs in promoting
organic versus acquisitive growth or a mix of the two.
But it is coming to be recognized that growth may also
be achieved through explorative activities that create
new products and markets as well as through the
exploitation of these innovations. As ventures
develop, particularly high tech cases, there may be a
shift from exploration to exploitation. This shift may
not be a wholesale move as it may be important to
maintain explorative activities that will help generate
future exploitations. Relatedly, growth may be
achieved in the technology market or the product
market or both. These different growth modes may
call for different nature of involvement by VCs as the
firm develops. They may also require different types of
VCs with different skills to be introduced. Although
Clarysse et al. (2011) have tentatively identified the
roles of different types of VCs able to bring differing
skills and amounts of funding according to the market
environmental context of the venture, research in this
area is at a relatively early stage. Devoting further
attention to this topic may be especially important in
yielding insights into the processes by which VCs
facilitate venture growth and why some VC backed
ventures grow more than others. With respect to both
VC firms and PE firms an unexplored issue concerns
the extent to which growth is achieved and value
created by integrating firms within their own
portfolios.
With respect to buyout stage investments, most
attention has traditionally focused upon PE firms. We
now know a substantial amount about the influence of
PE firms in value creation (Cumming et al. 2007;
Wright et al. 2009). However, while we are beginning
to gain insights into whether secondary and tertiary
deals generate further value creation (Nikoskelainen
and Wright 2007; Jelic and Wright 2011), understand-
ing of how this is created is limited. To what extent are
gains generated through further efficiency gains or
growth? What challenges are posed in creating these
gains in secondary and tertiary deals and how do they
differ from value creation in primary deals? To what
extent do secondary and tertiary deals involve the
introduction of larger PE investors with international
networks who can take firms to the next stage of
growth?
Besides PE firms, both VCs and BAs may be
involved in buyout deals, raising questions about what
distinctive expertise they bring. For example, to what
extent do BAs focus on funding buyouts of smaller
family firms and divisions that would not be attractive
to formal PE firms? This role may be an important one
given that many PE firms have largely vacated the
smaller end of the buyout market (CMBOR 2011).
However, we have little evidence of the extent to
which BAs invest in these kinds of deals, what the
nature of their relationship is with investees and what
their objectives are.
The economic environment, particularly the recent
financial crisis, may also play an important role in the
nature of involvement that is required of investors. For
example, while recession may require rescue and
restructuring of deals, there may still be growth
opportunities. Further, the nature of restructuring that
is undertaken may have adverse implications for the
longer term growth of the company. Different types of
investor may be better placed to provide different
types of assistance in such cases. For example, distress
and turnaround PE funds may approach buyouts in
distress differently from more traditional PE investors.
At present, we have little systematic evidence on the
different nature of the involvement by these types of
firms. Further, distress and turnaround funds may also
have different business models regarding how they
view the nature and timing of value creation, and this
warrants further examination. Expectations about
future economic development also influence the kind
of deals that investors seek and the consequent nature
of their relationships with portfolio companies.
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6 Entrepreneurial team context
Not only is the nature of the opportunity important in
the investor–investee relationship, but also the entre-
preneur or entrepreneurial team developing the oppor-
tunity. Little is known, however, on the importance of
complementarity of skills and resources embedded in
the entrepreneurial team and the investment firm. For
example, while some complementarity in resources
seems to be important for investors being able to add
value, some overlap might be fruitful to enhance
mutual understanding and hence learning. Further,
while most research to date focused on how investees
learn from investors, the latter may also learn from the
former. Finally, while numerous papers have examined
the replacement of entrepreneurs by their investors,
little is known about how investors are instrumental in
shaping the entrepreneurial teams. When do they add
or replace new team members? And how instrumental
are they in initiating the hiring of middle managers? Do
they actively recycle managerial talent between port-
folio companies? These questions, while important,
have largely been neglected up to now.
7 Institutional context
The influence of institutional contexts can be consid-
ered at both between country and within-country
regional levels. At the regional level, proximity
benefits in terms of access to VC/PEs may be
important in accessing funding and expertise that
can, for example, help early stage ventures to grow and
to enable buyouts of family firms and smaller divisions
to be effected. However, there has been little system-
atic analysis of the extent to which there is reliance on
local VC/PE firms versus the ability to attract investors
from further afield. Where does the boundary lie
between these two decisions and what influences it?
For example, to what extent do intermediaries play a
role in attracting VC/PE investors who are able to
provide the requisite kind of involvement even though
they are more distant? To what extent are proximity
benefits for obtaining the best fit of investor more
important for early, growth or buyout stage invest-
ments? To what extent are ‘good’ deals able to identify
and attract VC/PE investors who can provide the
relational investment they need from outside their
local environment? This also raises a wider issue
concerning the level of deal flow that is needed to
maintain a vibrant local VC/PE environment.
Successful investment by BAs may require the
ability to assemble regional syndicates of BAs who
can provide both expertise and more significant sums
of money to enable growth of early stage ventures that
are unable or unwilling to attract formal VC.
With respect to between country level issues, there
is a need to analyse to what extent the human and
social capital of VC and PE firm executives is mobile
across institutional boundaries (Meyer et al. 2009).
Yet, foreign VC/PEs may need to access expertise and
networks in the host country to supplement their own
expertise. More research is needed on how foreign
firms transfer and access expertise and how these feed
through into the relationships with portfolio firms.
With different regulatory frameworks in different
countries, notably differences in labour laws, PE firms
may need to adapt their approaches to restructuring
buyout deals. Alternatively, they may select different
types of deals.
Investor protection rights and enforcement thereof
largely differ between different contracts and institu-
tional contexts. This impacts investment strategies, the
nature of the contracts and therefore also the relation-
ship between investors and portfolio companies.
While research has been initiated in this area, more
insights are needed.
8 Future industry outlook
This special issue has aimed to reassess the relation-
ships between PE investors and their portfolio com-
panies in the light of the need for VC/PE firms to adapt
their strategies for value creation in the light of the
recent financial crisis. Since the onset of the financial
crisis in 2008 there has been debate about the recovery
of the global economy. During this period, there was
some modest recovery in VC and PE activity but this
remained well below earlier peaks, especially for early
stage VC (EVCA 2011). Economic recovery has
generally been slow and in 2011 further concerns were
raised about the impact of highly indebted nations on
worldwide growth and economic stability. As such,
the future trajectory of VC and PE market develop-
ment remains uncertain and along with it expected
developments in the relationships between VC/PE
firms and their portfolio companies.
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Four potential future development options for VC
and PE can be categorized in terms of combinations of
lower versus higher deal activity and lower versus
higher returns (Table 3). If macro-economic activity
continues to stabilize, quadrant 1 in Table 3 involving
low activity and low returns seems unlikely if
institutional investors’ interest returns to the market,
VC/PE firms are able to raise new funds, and
confidence returns regarding valuations and exit
markets. But if structural problems in the economy
are not resolved, significant market resurgence would
likely be delayed. Lack of LP interest and lack of deals
at attractive prices would cause many VC and PE firms
to exit. If potential deals are only available at high
entry prices, and access to debt finance remains
limited in an economy that is not growing, it may be
extremely difficult to generate significant returns.
Increased activity coupled with low returns, as in
quadrant 2, may arise if the economy improves but VC
and PE firms fail to develop their value adding skills.
Coming under pressure to invest the funds they have
raised, they might target poor deals, leading to poor
outcomes. A return to higher levels of deal activity and
higher returns would seem to require several devel-
opments to come together as shown in quadrant 3.
Besides developing VC and PE firm and investment
managers’ skills, there would need to be a resurgence
of debt funding, the identification of new deal types
and means found to add value to secondary and tertiary
deals. Finally, quadrant 4 envisages a more modest
level of deal activity but the generation of higher
returns as continuing VC and PE firms develop
differentiated value adding skills and focus on build-
up and secondary buyouts in an environment of
restricted primary deal availability. More sophisti-
cated VC and PE firms are expected to drive out
underperforming peers, leading to a shake-out in the
industry. At the time of writing (Fall 2011) it is unclear
which option seems most likely to unfold. However,
whichever scenarios emerge, they are likely to
emphasize the opportunities to examine the influence
of varying economic contexts on relationships
between PE investors and their portfolio companies.
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